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ARTICLE

IS A TRADEMARK OWNER'S RIGHT TO USE
ITS MARK PROTECTED BY THE FIRST

AMENDMENT?
Neal R. Platt*
Prior to the Supreme Court decision in Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,1 the first
amendment was held not to protect commercial speech. 2 Nonetheless, the judiciary disfavored governmental restrictions on a trademark owner's use of its mark, primarily out of deference to the owner's proprietary interest in its mark.3
In Virginia Pharmacy, the Court struck down the Commonwealth of Virginia's ban on pharmacists' advertising as a violation of
the public's first amendment right to receive truthful commercial information.4 Since Virginia Pharmacy, however, courts have failed to
apply the proper first amendment standards in passing on the constitutionality of governmental restrictions on nondeceptive trademark
use, and thus have not adequately protected the public's right to
* Associate, Fink, Weinberger, Fredman, Berman & Lowell, p.c.; B.S., 1975, Cornell
University; J.D., 1978, Hofstra University; LL.M. (Trade Regulation), 1982, New York University. The author would like to thank Professor Harry First of New York University School
of Law for his helpful criticism. Both Fink, Weinberger and Professor First are innocent of the
conclusions contained herein. This article is dedicated to the memories of Zachary B. Shwal,
Neil P. O'Doherty, and Jitendra Shah.
1. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
2. See, e.g., Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (upholding a prohibition on
distribution of handbills bearing commercial advertising).
3. See, e.g., Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 612 (1946) (holding that destruction of a trade name "should not be ordered if less drastic means will accomplish the same
result"); FTC v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S. 212, 217 (1933) (holding that the FrC's suppression of use of a deceptive trade name went further than was "reasonably necessary to
correct the evil" created).
4. See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 749-50, 762-65, 770, 773. Suit was brought by
prescription drug consumers who claimed "that they would greatly benefit if the prohibition
were lifted and advertising freely allowed." Id. at 753.
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know the important information which trademarks convey.5 The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that the public's constitutional
right to know' limits the government's right to restrict a trademark
owner's ability to use its mark, whether through legislative, judicial,
or administrative means.
This article posits that there are three phases in the life of a
trademark and that at each successive phase, the information conveyed by the mark increases until the mark reaches its tertiary, maximally informative phase.7 It discusses the first amendment standards applicable to a mark during each of these three phases" and
then applies these standards to past governmental restrictions on the
use of maximally informative marks to determine whether those restrictions would be held constitutional today.9
I.

THE TRADEMARK AS INFORMATION

A.

What is a Trademark?

Section 4510 of the Lanham Act11 defines a trademark as "any

word, name, symbol, or device or any combination thereof adopted
and used by a manufacturer or merchant to identify his goods and
distinguish them from those manufactured or sold by others."12 A
trademark can assume almost any imaginable form, as long as it is
applied to the goods and is perceptible to the buying public.13 It can
be a visual symbol, 14 an audible symbol, 15 trade dress on a package,16 a slogan, 17 or even the name of an imaginary character used in
5. See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979) (use of trade name has significant potential for deception, therefore may permissibly be regulated); infra notes 41-67 and accompanying text.
6. In Virginia Pharmacy, the Court stated that "[flreedom of speech presupposes a willing speaker." 425 U.S. at 756. Thus, freedom of speech "necessarily protects the right to
receive [information]." Id. at 757 (quoting Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143
(1943)).
7. See Infra notes 56-67 and accompanying text.
8. 'See Infra notes 68-92 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 94-167 and accompanying text.
10. Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
11. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
12. Id. § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127. This definition merely codified common law. See I J.
MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 4:4, at 105-06 (1973 & Supp. 1981).

13. See 1 J.MCCARTHY, supra note 12, §§ 3:1-3:5, at 85-96.
14. See, e.g., Federal Glass Co. v. Corning Glass Works, 162 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 279
(T.T.A.B. 1969) (stylized flower design held to function as a trademark).
15. See, e.g., Gottlieb, "In Case You Missed It .

. .,"

62 TRADE-MARK REP. 605

(1972) (discussing registration of NBC chimes as service mark).
16.

See, e.g., Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar-Well Foods Ltd., 568 F.2d 1342 (C.C.P.A.
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promoting the sale of a service."
As the statutory definition illustrates, the fundamental function
of a trademark is to identify the owner's goods and distinguish them
from those of others.19 Trademark rights in a perceptible signal are
acquired by using the signal to perform the trademark function.20
Through the owner's use of its mark, the public draws an association
between the signal and the seller or manufacturer, and the signal
becomes indicative of the goods' origin.

A seller will strive to strengthen the association in the public
mind between the mark and the positive attributes of its goods. Of
course, a seller's attempt can fail when, for example, the public associates the mark with the negative attributes of the seller's goods, rendering the mark valueless, or even a liability.21 Once acquired, trade-

in
mark protection can be lost
' '2a
abandonment 2 2 and "genericide.

several

ways,

including

1977); In re Days-Ease Home Prods. Corp., 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 566 (T.T.A.B. 1977) (distinctive shape of container held to function as a trademark).
17. See, e.g., In re McDonald's Corp., 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 490 (T.T.A.B. 1978)
("TWOALLBEEFPATTIESSPECIALSAUCELETrUCECHEESEPICKLESONIONSONASESAMESEEDBUN" held entitled to trademark registration).
18. See, e.g., In re Florida Cypress Gardens, Inc., 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 288 (T.T.A.B.
1980) ("Corky the Clown" held a registrable trademark for entertainment services). But see
In re Burger King Corp., 183 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 698 (T.T.A.B. 1974) (imaginary character
failed to create sufficient commercial impression for registration).
"Service mark" is defined in § 45 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1127. Because a service
is intangible, a mark obviously cannot be affixed to a service as it can be to a good. Although
this has some practical significance for an applicant seeking registration, see Lanham Act § 3,
15 U.S.C. § 1053 (1976), it has no significance in this article. "Trademark" and "service
mark" will be used interchangeably herein.
19. Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (definition of "trademark").
20. See id. § l(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(1) (1976) (application for registration must
allege applicant's "use in commerce"). The federal statutory definition of "use in commerce,"
unlike common law or state statutes, requires that the goods associated with a mark be sold or
transported in interstate commerce. See id. § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127. Because the patent and
copyright clause of the Constitution, U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, does not give Congress
plenary power over trademarks, see Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879), the interstate
commerce clause, U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, has been used as the basis for asserting congressional authority over trademarks. See Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (final
paragraph).
21. One can imagine that there might be commercial drawbacks to marketing a 1983model automobile under the mark "Corvair," vichyssoise under the mark "Bon Vivant," or a
tampon under the mark "Rely." Cf. Kleinfield, Long, Uphill Odds for Tylenol, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 8, 1982, at DI, col. 3.
22. See Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (abandonment of mark presumed after two
years of continuous nonuse); infra notes 217-18 and accompanying text.
23. Genericide occurs when the signal has ceased to perform the trademark function
because it no longer distinguishes the goods of the owner from the goods of others. See 1 J.
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Leaving aside constructive notice 24 and other statutory refinements of trademark rights, the essential trademark right can be
briefly described by the following pristine hypothetical:
A Corp., a manufacturer of widgets, has been selling its widgets
throughout the state of New York for twenty years under the
trademark A. Yesterday, B Corp. opened a widget plant and began
affixing the A trademark to its widgets and selling them in New
York. Today, A Corp. sued to enjoin B Corp. from selling widgets
in New York under the A mark.
Under these ideal conditions, A Corp. should win.25 B Corp. may
continue to sell its widgets in New York, of course, under any name
but A (or any other confusingly similar name).26
A Corp.'s right in its mark consists of its ability to prevent B
Corp. from purveying a signal that will likely mislead the public into
believing that B Corp.'s goods are in fact A Corp.'s goods, thereby
tricking the public into buying B Corp.'s goods. In one sense, then,
trademark infringement can be thought of as a misrepresentation of
the goods' origin.27
For purposes of the ensuing constitutional analysis, it is essential to mention whose interests the law seeks to protect in effectuating A Corp.'s desire to stop B Corp. from selling competitive goods
under the A mark. The law seeks to protect:
(1) A Corp., from another seller who would divert A
Corp.'s sales and be unjustly enriched through trading on A
Corp.'s reputation and who might damage A Corp.'s reputa28
tion by selling inferior merchandise under the A mark;
(2) The public, from being deceived into buying B
on the representation that the goods
Corp.'s goods in reliance
29
come from A Corp.;
McCarthy, supra note 12, § 12:1, at 405-06; infra app. notes 220-24 and accompanying text.
24. See Lanham Act § 22, 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (1976).
25. See Id. § 2(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (1976).
26. See Id. See also Pennwatt Corp. v. Center Laboratories, Inc. 187 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
599 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (similarity of "Allerset" and "Allerest" likely to be confusing).

27. In practice, of course, possible variations on this simplest of hypotheticals are infinite. For example, one can readily envision situations in which A Corp.'s and B Corp.'s respective areas of competition do not coincide, but are overlapping or contiguous: where the marks
are arguably dissimilar; where A Corp. has allowed B Corp. to infringe for such a long time
that it would be unfair to allow A Corp. to prevail; or where the goods of the two companies
are arguably dissimilar. On this last point, see Goldberg & Borchard, Related Goods Trademark Cases in the Second Circuit, 70 TRADE-MARK REP. 287 (1980).
28. See I J. MCCARTHY, supra note 12, §§ 2:7-:11, at 57-74.

29. See Id.

§§ 2:12-:14 at 74-84. Even where B Corp. sells goods of equal quality under
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(3) Both A Corp. and the public, from the loss of a reliable shorthand signal for indicating the origin of the goods.30
B.

What Information Does a Trademark Impart?

Prior to Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc.,3 1 the Supreme Court had held commercial
speech to be outside the scope of first amendment protection.32 In
Valentine v. Chrestensen,3 3 the Court sustained a New York City
ordinance which prohibited the distribution of all handbills except
those "solely devoted to 'information or a public protest.' ,31 The
Court held that the first amendment imposes no restraint on govern'3
ment regulation "as respects purely commercial advertising. 5
The severity, as well as the clarity, of this rule was gradually
eroded during the 1960's and early 1970's.3 1 Finally, in 1976, the
Supreme Court overturned Chrestensen in Virginia Pharmacy, affording constitutional protection to the free flow of truthful commercial information. Since that decision, which struck down a ban on
prescription drug advertising, the Court has overturned bans on posting "For Sale" signs in a residential neighborhood,38 lawyers' advertising,3 9 and advertising by public utilities.40 In Friedman v. Rogthe A mark, the public is not getting what it expects. If consumers prefer goods of one type
and are deceived into buying goods of another type, the illegality of the deception cannot be
cured by proof of equal quality. Cf. FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 387 (1965);
FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67, 78 (1934) (holding proof of equal quality is not
relevant for purposes of finding deception under the Federal Trade Commission Act).
30. If B Corp. and others are permitted to use the A mark, the public will realize eventually that the mark has ceased to distinguish the goods of A Corp. from the goods of others.
See McCarthy, Compulsory Licensing of a Trademark. Remedy or Penalty?, 67 TRADEMARK REP. 197, 230-32 (1977).

31. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
32. See, e.g., Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). But see Leach v. Carlile,
258 U.S. 138, 140 (1922) (Holmes & Brandeis, JJ., dissenting); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S.
727 (1877).
33. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
34. Id. at 53.
35. Id. at 54.
36. In chronological order, the decisions which eroded the Chrestensen doctrine were:
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809
(1975).
37. See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770-73.
38. Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
39. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
40. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
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ers,41 the Court, however, declined to extend the logic of its prior
commercial speech decisions when faced with the question whether
the first amendment protects a trademark owner's right to use its
mark without governmental interference.
In Friedman, Dr. Rogers, "an advocate of the commercial practice of optometry,"' 42 sought declaratory and injunctive relief against
enforcement of a Texas statute which prohibited the practice of optometry under a trade name other than the optometrist's personal
name. 4 3 To warrant protection under Virginia Pharmacy, a trade
name would have to impart truthful commercial information. 4 ' The
Court, however, upheld the Texas statute. The opinions by the Justices in Friedman illustrate divergent viewpoints on whether a trade
name conveys protective information.
1. Majority View.-Denying first amendment protection to
Dr. Rogers' use of a nonpersonal trade name in his optometric practice, the majority distinguished its prior decisions invalidating state
bans on pharmacists'

45

and lawyers'4 6 advertising:

In those cases, the State had proscribed advertising by pharmacists
and lawyers that contained statements about the products or services offered and their prices. These statements were self-contained
and self-explanatory. Here, we are concerned with a form of commercial speech that has no intrinsic meaning. A trade name conveys no information about the price and nature of the services offered by an optometrist until it acquires meaning over a period of
time by associations formed in the minds of the public between the
name and some standard of price or quality. Because these ill-defined associations of trade names with price and quality information can be manipulated by the users of trade names, there is a
significant
possibility that trade names will be used to mislead the
47
public.

The majority then recited a litany of ways in which unscrupulous
41.

440 U.S. 1 (1979).

42. Id. at 5-6. Texas optometrists had informally divided themselves into two camps,
those of "professional" and "commercial" practitioners. Id. at 5. Dr. Rogers was the leader of
the commercial forces. Together with his associates, he operated more than 100 optometry
offices under a nonpersonal trade name. Id. at 21 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
43. Id. at 6. See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
44. See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770-73.
45. See Id at 748.
46. See Bates v.State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
47. Friedman, 440 U.S. at 12-13 (footnotes omitted).
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optometrists could deceive the public through the use of trade
names. 48 Writing for the majority, Justice Powell appears to have
held that a trade name conveys a small quantum of information
whose social value is greatly outweighed by its enormous capacity to
deceive.49
2. Minority View.-Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented from the Court's upholding of the ban on optometric
trade names.50 The dissenters characterized trade names as "a vital
form of commercial speech," 51 and adopted the following approach
posited by Professor Benham, a noted economist:
"One of the most valuable assets which individuals have in
this large mobile country is their knowledge about trade names.
Consumers develop a sophisticated understanding of the goods and
services provided and the prices associated with different trade
names. This permits them to locate the goods, services, and prices
they prefer on a continuing basis with substantially lower search
costs than would otherwise be the case. This can perhaps be illustrated by pointing out the information provided by such names as
Sears, Neiman Marcus or Volkswagen. This also means that firms
have an enormous incentive to develop and maintain the integrity
of the products and services provided under their trade name: the
entire package they offer is being judged continuously by consum48. See id. at 13. The Court stated that a trade name, by its continuity, could conceal
changes in staff. Trade names might also permit an optometrist with a tarnished reputation to

adopt a new name. In addition, trade names can give the appearance of competition among
shops using different names but under common ownership. The Court also found that the use
of trade names facilitates large-scale advertising which a state may wish to "discourage." Id.
Many of the artifices listed by the Court could be applied as easily to any other industry
which uses trade names. It is disturbing to note that this may portend the Court's willingness
to uphold state restrictions on trade name use generally. At some point, state regulation would
have to yield to the federal policy encouraging trademark use and protection embodied in the
Lanham Act.
The term "trade name" is defined in the Lanham Act separately from the terms "trademark" and "service mark." See Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1976). A trade name is
essentially the name of a business firm. Id. A trade name, however, can become a registrable
trademark or service mark in the same manner as any other signal. It is clear from Friedman
that Dr. Rogers' trade name was being used as a service mark. See 440 U.S. at 21-23 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). For purposes of this discussion, any difference between trademarks and trade names is irrelevant.
49. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563
(1980) ("The government may ban forms of communication more likely to deceive the public
than to inform it.") (citing Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 13, 15-16 (1979)).
50. Friedman, 440 U.S. at 19-28 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
51. Id. at 22 n.3 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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'52

The dissent also noted that if, as the majority held, a trade name has
no intrinsic meaning, then "it cannot by itself be deceptive. A trade
name will deceive only if it is used in a misleading context." 53
C. Three Phases in the Life of a Trademark
Neither the majority nor the dissent in Friedman v. Rogers"
denied that a trade name is susceptible of deceptiveness.5 5 The difference of opinion betwee_ the majority and the dissent can perhaps
best be explained as a basic disagreement over what information a
trade name conveys and the value of that information. Furthermore,
neither the majority nor the dissent was entirely wrong about what
information a trade name conveys. The opinions diverged because
they focused on different points in the life of a trade name. Returning to our hypothetical, let us examine the information conveyed
by the trademark at each phase of its life.
Two years before A Corp. was formed under the laws of New
York, inventor Jones developed a highly efficient widget-production
process and planned to form a corporation to produce widgets. Jones
sought a corporate name which, he hoped, would also become a
trusted trademark for widgets. At this point the term "A" was
merely one of a nearly infinite number of possible signals which
Jones could have chosen as his corporate name.
Jones called his lawyer and asked her if there was any limit on
his choice of a corporate name. She explained that there were some
limits on available corporate names and asked what names Jones had
in mind. Jones supplied three fanciful possibilities: "The Widget
Trust," "The Widget Exchange," and "A". Jones' lawyer explained
that, according to New York State law, any corporate name would
have to contain a corporate designation, such as "corporation" or
"incorporated." 56 She further explained that "The Widget Trust"
could not be used as a corporate name in New York because it contained the word "trust,15 7 and that "The Widget Exchange" could
not be used without the attorney general's approval because it con52. Id. at 22-23 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted) (quoting deposition of Lee Kenneth Benham).
53. Id. at 24 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
54. 440 U.S. 1 (1979).
55. Id. at 12-13; id. at 24 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
56. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 301(a)(1) (McKinney 1963).
57.

See Id. § 301(a)(5)(B) (McKinney Supp. 1982).
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tained the word "exchange." 58 Rather than develop additional alternatives, Jones chose "A Corp." and his lawyer filed a certificate of
incorporation under that name.
At this preselection stage, any of these alternative names, absent statutory proscription, were capable of becoming a quality indicator through adoption and use. Aside from Jones' slight disappointment, however, neither Jones nor the public was seriously inconvenienced by the state's prohibition on Jones' incorporation under
a potentially deceptive name. 9 Jones still had a nearly infinite pool
of names from which to choose, minus an insignificant number of
prohibited names. Let us refer to the preselection phase as the primary phase in the life of the A mark.
On the first day of its widget production, A Corp. most likely
intended its application of the A trademark to mean simply, "this
widget was manufactured by A Corp.," and that is probably what
the first buyer thought when he saw the mark on the widget at the
time of sale. At this point, as the Friedman majority stated, the
trademark had no intrinsic meaning to the consumer."' It did, however, have an intrinsic meaning to Jones. Applying the A mark was
Jones' way of saying "I made this." The A mark became more than
a possible trademark, although it. had not yet reached the stage
where it actually communicated a certain level of quality to the public. By transcending mere possibility and becoming a potential quality indicator, the A mark entered its secondary phase. This is tantamount to saying that the mark had been selected and was being used
to indicate the source of goods in a way that would almost certainly
cause it imminently to become an indicator of quality to the public.
The A signal had become a trademark but had not yet reached its
full informative potential.
Now let us assume that most widget buyers entirely consume
one widget every two months and re-enter the widget market imme58. See id.§ 301(a)(10) (McKinney Supp. 1982).
59. Not all restrictions on trademark use deal with corporate names. Both the federal
and New York trademark statutes eliminate certain categories, such as immoral, deceptive, or
scandalous marks, from the pool of registrable trademarks irrespective of the form of business
organization employed by the registrant. See Lanham Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1976); N.Y.
GEN. Bus. LAW § 361(a) (McKinney 1968).
60. See Friedman,440 U.S. at 12-13. The trademark restriction sub judice in Friedman
not only banned the future adoption of optometric trade names, but stifled the use of trademarks already in use. See infra text accompanying notes 62-65. Cf. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-102(B)(1981)(prohibiting attorneys from using trade names).

The majority's focus on information imparted only by newly adopted trade names seems to
have been inappropriate.
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diately thereafter. After a few months, the prospective purchaser
who has used an A widget will reap additional and crucial information from the appearance of the A mark on a widget. The mark will
say something like: "This widget was manufactured by the people
who made the durable widget you used last week," or perhaps, "this
widget was manufactured by the people who made the widget that
spontaneously exploded and burned down your garage last week," or
possibly something in between, depending on the purchaser's past experience with A widgets.61 In any case, the experienced A widget
user will consider his or her past experience with A widgets before
purchasing another, relying on the probability that the next will
likely perform much like the last. Whether the prospective purchaser
will purchase another A widget will depend largely upon A Corp.'s
quality control and adeptness at perceiving and anticipating the
needs of widget consumers.62 By this phase, the A signal has entered
its tertiaryphase, having attained its full informative potential as an
actual quality indicator. It was upon this point in the trademark's
life that the Friedman dissenters focused.68
How could the Friedman majority and dissent have made such
contradictory characterizations of the quantum of information conveyed by the same trademark? The answer lies in the failure of the
Texas statute under consideration to distinguish among the three
phases of a trademark's life. The statute, as adopted in 1969, provided in pertinent part: "No optometrist shall practice or continue to
practice optometry under. . . any name other than the name under
which he is licensed to practice optometry in Texas .
",.
4 Thus,
61. At some later point, A Corp. may license the mark to another widget manufacturer,
B Corp. Such a license can be given only if A Corp. retains the right to control the quality of B
Corp.'s goods bearing the A mark. See Lanham Act § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 1060 (1976) (same
restriction on assignment of trademark). If A Corp. fails to retain the right to quality control,
the license (a "naked" license) is deemed void and A Corp.'s rights in the mark may be inferred to have been abandoned. See Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 293 F.
Supp. 892, 917-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). For a discussion of the potentially disastrous effect of a
naked license, see Sheila's Shine Prods., Inc. v. Sheila Shine, Inc., 486 F.2d 114, 123-24 (5th
Cir. 1973). If the license were not naked, the mark could more precisely be deemed to inform
the prospective purchaser: "This widget was manufactured by someone over whom A Corp.
had the right of quality control." It is unlikely, however, that many purchasers would care to
know the details of the business relationship which produces the A widget.
62. See generally F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 376-80 (2d ed. 1980).

63, Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
64. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4552-5.13(d) (Vernon 1976) (emphasis added),
amended by TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4552-5.13(d) (Vernon Supp. 1982). The
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in a single stroke, the Texas Legislature banned all optometrists'
nonpersonal trade names, including those which had alteady attained
their full informative potential. According to the Supreme Court
opinions,"5 it appears that Dr. Rogers' mark had become an effective
quality indicator.
The Court was thus faced with the dilemma of choosing among
three imperfect holdings: (1) upholding the statute as it applied to
all optometric trade names; (2) striking down the statute as it applied to all optometric trade names; or (3) finding that the Texas
statute was constitutionally required to "grandfather in" marks
which had reached a fully informative phase prior to enactment of
the ban. 6 Striking down the statute completely would have given
full first amendment protection to marks in not only the tertiary, but
also the primary and secondary phases of informativeness. As we
will see later, this would have given first amendment protection
where it was not due.67 The "grandfathering" alternative would have
at least protected "free speech" based upon the date when the
speaker began speaking, a result which would have given the owners
of the grandfathered marks an unwarranted competitive advantage.
Left with these possibilities the Court chose one of the more sensible
and certainly the most easily administered alternatives, but not the
one which was most consistent with the spirit of its prior commercial
speech decisions.
Friedman can be read as holding that all trademark use falls
outside the scope of first amendment protection. However, this reading would render Friedman entirely inconsistent with the Court's
later refinement of the commercial speech test. In hindsight, it would
have been better had the Court struck down the statute as it applied
amended statute now provides: "An optometrist may practice optometry under a trade name
or an assumed name or under the name of a professional corporation or a professional association." Id. The same subsection requires an optometrist to display his actual name in the reception area. Id.
65. The district court finding that the public "identif[ied] the [trade] name with a certain quality of service and goods," Friedman v. Rogers, 438 F. Supp. 428, 431 (E.D. Tex.
1977), affd in part and rev'd in part, 440 U.S. 1 (1979), was not disturbed on appeal. See
Friedman,440 U.S. at 8. In fact, the mark ("Texas State Optical" or "TSO") had been in use
before the Texas trade name ban was adopted. See id. at 21 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
66. In fact, the statute contained a very limited grandfather clause which the Court
apparently deemed relevant only to the possible, but unraised, taking of property issue. See
Friedman,440 U.S. at 12 n. 11; TEx. RaV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4552-5.13(k) (Vernon 1976),
amended by Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4552-5.13 (Vernon Supp. 1982).

67. See infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
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to all marks and left it to the Texas Legislature to design a statute
that permitted at the minimum, the use of all quality-indicative,
nondeceptive trade names. As the next section demonstrates, the
Court's later refinement of its commercial speech test casts serious
doubt on the continued validity of the broad implications of its holding in Friedman.
II. THE EFFECT OF THE PUBLIC'S RIGHT TO KNOW ON
GOVERNMENTAL POWER TO RESTRICT TRADEMARK USE

A.

First Amendment Standards

In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission,8 the Supreme Court addressed the question "whether
a regulation of the Public Service Commission of the State of New
York violate[d] the First and Fourteenth Amendments because it
completely ban[ned] promotional advertising by an electrical util70
ity." The Court held that the ban did violate those amendments.
For purposes of this article, the primary importance of CentralHudson is not its holding, but rather its elaboration of the constitutional
standards applied to commercial speech:
In commercial speech cases , . . a four-part analysis has developed. At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is
protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come
within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and
not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental
interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we
must determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether
it is not more extensive
71
than is necessary to serve that interest.
The Court distinguished Friedman v. Rogers,7 2 citing it for the proposition that "[the government may ban forms of communication
more likely to deceive the public than to inform it."17 3 If Friedman
stood for no more than that proposition, it would be easily distinguishable from Central Hudson. Unfortunately, the cases are diffi68. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
69. Id. at 558.
70. Id. at 572.
71. Id. at 566. The Court recently elaborated on the requirement that the activity be
lawful. See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 486
(1982) (permitting municipality to ban "head shops").
72. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979).
73. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563 (citing Friedman,440 U.S. at 13, 15-16).
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cult to harmonize.
Applying the Central Hudson test7 4 to the facts in Friedman,
we look first to whether the expression is protected by the first
amendment. According to Central Hudson, this requires that the expression concern lawful activity, which in Friedman was the lawful
sale of licensed optometric services, and that the expression not be
misleading. There was no finding in Friedman that the expression
was misleading.7 5 The majority deemed it sufficient to point to the
potential deception that could be performed with any trade name.76
Dr. Rogers' own use of his trade name in a way that was neither
unlawful nor misleading passes muster under both criteria and
should have been held protected.
Was the governmental interest in Friedman substantial? According to the Court, the statute involved was calculated to "ensur[e] that information regarding optometrical services [would] be
communicated more fully and accurately to consumers than it had
been in the past when optometrists were allowed to convey the information through unstated and ambiguous associations with a trade
name."7 7 While this state interest may seem substantial in the abstract, one may doubt whether the question of substantiality of state
interest can be meaningfully addressed without reference to the social value of the information being quashed, an issue which the
Court never examined. Furthermore, whether this state interest was
truly the basis for the legislature's enactment of this statute is not
easily ascertainable. 8
Did the trade name ban "directly" advance the governmental
interest asserted? Stated as it is in the above quotation, 78 the state's
interest seems to be served by the statute.
On the "no more extensive than necessary" step of the Central
Hudson test, however, the Friedman Court stumbled. The dissenters
correctly found that the statute unconstitutionally banned nondeceptive trade name use. 80 There was no evidence that Dr. Rogers had
actually deceived anyone. The Friedman majority permitted a state
74.
75.
76.

See supra text accompanying note 71.
See Friedman, 440 U.S. at 8, supra note 65 and accompanying text.
See id. at 12-13.

77.

Id. at 16.

78. Neither the district court's nor the Supreme Court's opinions discuss the legislative
intent regarding the statute in question. See 438 F. Supp. 428 (E.D. Tex. 1977) and 440 U.S.

1 (1979).
79.
80.

See supra text accompanying note 77.
Friedman,440 U.S. at 28 (Blackmun, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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to ban an entire category of commercial speech on the grounds that
the category as a whole was potentially misleading.81 The majority
neglected to address the "least restrictive remedy" standard which
would have required the Court to limit the ban to misleading optometric trade name use. The Court thus allowed Texas to toss out the
baby with the bathwater, the very result that the fourth prong of the
Central Hudson test was designed to prohibit.82 The majority
seemed unconcerned that without a trademark, commercial advertising is nearly worthless"3 and that by banning optometrists' trade
names, Texas successfully banned optometrist advertising outside the
small area around a given practice.
Friedmanis an anomaly in the first amendment law of commercial speech, affording insufficient protection to a trademark which
had already attained its maximally informative phase as a nondeceptive quality indicator. It is to be hoped that the Friedman holding
will be limited to its facts.8
B. How Much Protection Is Warranted at Each Phase?
1. Primary Phase.-At the primary phase in a trademark's
life, i.e., the preselection phase, first amendment protection is unwarranted. The mark is not in use, so it cannot be said to be an expression of any sort, either by the prospective owner or to the public. At
this phase, the minimal due process standard applicable to regulation
of other commercial behavior should be applied.85 Thus, the government has the legitimate power to eliminate potentially deceptive signals from the infinite pool of potential quality indicators "[i]f the
laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper8 legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory."
2. Secondary Phase.-During the mark's secondary phase,
once it has been adopted and used, but before an appreciable number of buyers regard it as a quality indicator, the mark conveys commercial information only to the extent that it communicates, as in
81. See McCarthy, Important Trends in Trademark and Unfair Competition Law During the Decade of the 1970's, 71 TRADE-MARK Rup. 93, 116-17 (1981).
82. See supra text accompanying note 71.
83. See F. SCHERER, supra note 62, at 378.
84. Friedman may be one in a line of cases retreating from the broad sweep of Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumers Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
See generally G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1396-97 (10th ed. 1980).
85. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934).
86. Id., quoted In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447
U.S. 557, 590 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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our hypothetical, "Jones (or A Corp.) made this." Since the mark
communicates to the public nothing of present value to it, the mark
does not warrant first amendment protection as commercial speech.
At this stage, under minimal due process standards, the mark may
warrant more protection than a primary-phase mark, and a more
substantial governmental purpose should be required to outweigh the
owner's unrestricted right to use the mark. The secondary phase in a
trademark's life is apt to be ephemeral and, with diligent marketing
efforts on the part of the owner, can be shortened to a few purchase
cycles. 7
Because the secondary phase of a trademark's life is so brief,
courts will rarely be called upon to enunciate a standard to be applied to a mark in this phase. The extent to which government can
interfere with the owner's use in this phase will be difficult to decide
and will turn upon the different facts in each case. Experience demonstrates that the great majority of trademarks upon which courts
are asked to pass judgment fall into the tertiary phase.
3. Tertiary (Maximally Informative) Phase.-The precise
point at which a mark enters its tertiary, maximally informative
phase as a quality indicator is not easy to ascertain, but may be
proven in the same manner as secondary meaning, i.e., by affidavit
and survey evidence. 88 Passage to this phase should entitle the mark
to all the first amendment protection commercial speech can receive.89 Restrictions on the owner's use of a mark at this stage must
satisfy the Central Hudson four-step analysis9" in every regard. 1 As
87.

The duration of a purchase cycle will vary greatly among products. The purchase

cycle for automobiles is obviously much longer than that for facial tissues.
88. See generally 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 12, §§ 15:10-:25 (explaining methods of
proving secondary meaning).
89. See Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.

748 (1976).
90.

See supra text accompanying note 71.

91.

Could the government constitutionally restrict the term of a trademark as the Fed-

eral Government does with patents and copyrights? Alternatively, could a federal registration

be made nonrenewable consistently with the first amendment? These questions are impossible
to answer in the abstract. Central Hudson would require such restrictions, if applicable to fully
informative marks, to further a substantial governmental interest in a manner that is no more
extensive than necessary. It is difficult to conceive of a governmental interest that would militate in favor of such a restriction. Presumably, such a statute might be adopted out of fear of
the allegedly anticompetitive effects of trademark use. For a discussion of such effects, see
infra notes 171-228 and accompanying text. Fear of anticompetitive effects appears to be the

purpose underlying the constitutional provision which permits Congress to grant patents and
copyrights for only limited times: "The Congress shall have Power. . . [t]o promote the Pro-
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a practical matter, then, the government may act with least restraint
when it restricts the use of marks not yet adopted or only recently
adopted, but it acts at its peril when it attempts to restrict the use of
a mark which the public has come to regard as a quality indicator.
No trademark-restriction case discussed in this article fails to
enunciate a legitimate governmental interest. Instead, the basic flaw
in many cases is that they either answer incorrectly or neglect to
focus on the questions: "Does the restriction directly advance the
state interest without unnecessarily impinging on other state interests of equal importance?" and "could a more limited restriction on
commercial speech serve the state interest as well?" Yet, the answers to these questions are decisive.92

C. First Amendment Limitations on Governmental Power and
Past Restrictions on Trademark Use
Before Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service

Commission,9 3 governmental actions restricting an owner's use of its
established trademark generally did one or more of the following:
1. Prevented the owner from using its trademark for a fixed
or indefinite term;
2. Conditioned the owner's continued use of the mark on its
performance of, or forbearance from, some other act;
3. Restricted the time, place, or manner in which the owner
might display its mark;
gress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8,cl.8
(emphasis added).
92. So important are these questions that the constitutionality of FTC jurisdiction to
regulate unfair advertising is in doubt. See S. REP. No. 500, 96th.Cong., 2d Sess. 17-18,
reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1102, 1118-20. The Supreme Court recently struck down a state restriction on lawyers' advertising based on criteria which were
broader than deceptiveness. See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982). In addition, the Reagan
Administration cited constitutional concerns in casting a negative vote on the World Health
Organization's proposed ban on direct advertising of breast milk substitutes:
[I]t places a complete ban on advertising to the general public whether the material
being advertised is truthful or not truthful. Now that has grave constitutional
problems for us; we couldn't adopt it here at home, and we can't recommend it for
anyone else.
Here is an effort to control the free flow of what can be truthful information
in a commercial context. It's not something that we can support.
The MacNeil-Lehrer Report, Transcript No. 1472, at 2-3 (May 19, 1981) (remarks of Elliott
Abrams, Assistant Secretary of State for Int'l Org. Affairs).
93. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
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4. Compelled the owner to permit some other business(es) to
use the owner's mark for a fixed or indefinite term (known as
"compulsory trademark licensing").
For discussion purposes, each of these remedies will be treated
separately.
1. Trademark Excision.-Courts and administrative agencies
have ordered a trademark owner to stop using its mark in two basic
types of cases: deception and monopolization.
a. Deception.-In FTC v. Royal Milling Co.,94 the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) had issued cease and desist orders
preventing certain preparers of flour from using trade names containing the words "milling company," "mill," or words of similar import, since none of the respondent companies milled grain into
flour.9 5 Although the Supreme Court agreed with the conclusion of
the FTC 96 that the deceptive use of the trade names was an unfair
trade practice,97 the Court remanded the orders suppressing use of
the trade names, stating:
These names have been long in use, in one instance beginning as
early as 1902. They constitute valuable business assets in the nature of good will, the destruction of which probably would be highly injurious and should not be ordered if less drastic means will
accomplish the same result. The orders should go no further than is
reasonably necessary to correct the evil and preserve the rights of
competitors and public; and this can be done .. .by requiring
proper qualifying words to be used in immediate connection with
the names.98
Similarly, in Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC,99 the Court found that the
100
FTC had failed to consider whether an order "short of excision"
would eliminate the deceptiveness of the trade name "Alpacuna" as
94. 288 U.S. 212 (1933).
95. See In re McGraw, 15 F.T.C. 38, 42, 47-48 (1931), rev'd sub noma.
Royal Milling
Co. v. FTC, 58 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1932), rev'd, 288 U.S. 212 (1933).
96. On appeal to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, the FTC's cease and desist orders
were overturned on the ground that even if the practices enjoined were deceptive, the resultant
harm amounted only to a private harm, not a public wrong requiring Commission action.
Royal Milling, 58 F.2d 581, 583 (6th Cir. 1932) revg sub nom. In re McGraw, 15 F.T.C. 38
(1931). The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit, holding that "the purchasing public is
entitled to be protected against [this] species of deception." 288 U.S. at 217.
97. Royal Milling, 288 U.S. at 217.
98. Id. (citations omitted).
99. 327 U.S. 608 (1946).
100. Id. at 614.
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applied to fabrics containing no vicuna. 10 1 The case was remanded to
the court of appeals to enable it to consider whether a lesser remedy
10 2
would suffice.
Royal Milling and Jacob Siegel form the basis of a consistent
judicial policy.103 Neither decision explicitly addressed whether a
trademark constitutes property within the scope of the due process
clause of the fifth amendment.1 04 The language quoted above,105
however, coupled with the fact that the decisions antedate the first
amendment approach of Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Vir-

ginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.10 demonstrates that in enunciating the "least-restrictive-remedy" test, the Court was primarily
concerned not with the first amendment interests of either the owner
or the public, but with the owner's fifth amendment property interests. 07 Freedom of speech was not mentioned in either opinion. 08
101. Id. at 609.
102. See ld. at 614.
103. See, e.g., Korber Hats, Inc. v. FTC, 311 F.2d 358 (1st Cir. 1962) (remanding case
to FTC for consideration of whether a less drastic remedy than excision could eliminate deception in using "Milan" as a trade name in connection with hats); Carter Prods., Inc. v. FTC,
268 F.2d 461 (9th Cir. 1959) (permitting order excising "liver" from trade name "Carter's
Little Liver Pills" upon finding of no beneficial effect on liver); Elliot Knitwear, Inc. v. FTC,
266 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1959) (remanding case to FTC for consideration whether order compelling disclosure of fiber content could cure deceptiveness of trade name "Cashmora" as used in
connection with fabric containing no cashmere). See also In re Bakers Franchise Corp., 59
F.T.C. 70 (1961) (deceptiveness of "Lite Diet" trade name for bread could be cured only by
excision because only dietetic characteristic of bread was that it was thinly sliced), aff'd, 302
F.2d 258 (3d Cir. 1962).
104. "[N]or shall any person . . . be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
105. See supra text accompanying note 98.
106. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
107. This, of course, raises the question whether a trademark is a property or liberty
right. In Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), the Supreme Court seemed to imply that an
individual's general reputation is neither property nor liberty. See 1d. at 701. In that case, a
private citizen had sued a state law enforcement officer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. IV
1980), alleging that the officer had, under color of state law, published plaintiff's name and
likeness on a list of "Active Shoplifters." 424 U.S. at 694-97. The Court held that plaintiff
failed to assert a claim cognizable under § 1983 because plaintiff's interest in "reputation
alone" does not constitute liberty or property under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, Id. at 712, but merely an interest which may or may not be protected by state
defamation law. On the other hand, the Court has held that whether a right is property or
liberty is not in the first instance a constitutional question. Such interests can arise from common law, statute, or usage. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, (1972). The
Lanham Act, state trademark laws, and federal and state common law relating to trademarks
would seem to give rise to property and liberty interests in trademarks. See also Ford Motor
Co. v.United States, 405 U.S. 562, 576 n.11 (1972).
108, In Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979), the Supreme Court distinguished Royal
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Although the "least restrictive remedy" test was fashioned to
satisfy fifth amendment concerns, it can also suffice for first amendment purposes where a trademark is a source of actual deception.
This is the simplest of cases, because the government's legitimate
interest in preventing deception is coterminous with the public's interest in not being deceived x01 and, as indicated earlier, the trademark owner has no countervailing constitutional right to deceive the
public.1 10 Based as it is on protection of the property interests of the
Milling and Jacob Siegel on the ground that those decisions expounded a limit on FTC enforcement jurisdiction which arose out of deference to property interests. See Friedman, 440
U.S. at 12 n.1 1. The Court stated: "[T]here is no First Amendment rule ... requiring a State
to allow deceptive or misleading commercial speech whenever the publication of additional
information can clarify or offset the effects of the spurious communication." Id. See Encyclopaedia Brittanica, Inc. v. FTC, 605 F.2d 964 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 934
(1980); National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition v. FTC, 570 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978). But see McCarthy, supra note 30, at 236-39. In his discussion of
Royal Milling and Jacob Siegel, Professor McCarthy seems to have taken the position, albeit
not explicitly, that first amendment values underlie the "least restrictive remedy" test. Id.
Indeed, under Central Hudson it has become one prong of the first amendment commercial
speech test. See supra text accompanying note 71.
109. See generally Tomei v. Finley, 512 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Ill. 1981). At least one
judge has suggested that a little trademark infringement may be good for the consumer. See
Standard Brands, Inc. v. Smidler, 151 F.2d 34, 41 (2d Cir. 1945) (Frank, J.,concurring).
110. If the commercial speech doctrine is intended to protect the public's right to receive
truthful commercial information, see Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 733, then the public
may have a right to compel the government to allow an owner to use its mark in a truthful
way. The possibility that the public's right may form the basis of an implied right of action
under the first amendment merits consideration. In Virginia Pharmacy,the plaintiff-consumers
alleged not only first and fourteenth amendment violations, but also a violation of 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (Supp. IV 1980) because of state restrictions on advertising by pharmacists. 373 F. Supp.
683, 684 (E.D. Va. 1974). Section 1983 provides for a private right of action against persons
who deprive another of constitutional rights under color of state law. The district court, in
holding that the statute violated the first amendment rights of plaintiff-consumers, did not
address the section 1983 issue. See id. at 685. Appeal to the Supreme Court focused only on
the constitutional question, and not the statutory issue. See 425 U.S. at 750-51.
While section 1983 provides a private right of action against persons who deprive another of
constitutional rights under color of state law, section 1983 does not apply to similar violations
committed under color offederal law. To remedy this anomalous situation, the Supreme Court
has "discovered" an implied right of action arising directly under the fourth amendment. See
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). No
great leap of imagination is required to hypothesize a private right of action on the part of a
member of the public against a federal officer acting in violation of the Federal Constitution
by improperly restricting another's trademark use. See generally Student Project, Constitutional Torts Ten Years After Bivens, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 943, 1005-08 (1981) (describing first
amendment applications of Bivens). However, under current standing doctrine, the injury to an
individual member of the public may be too diffuse to warrant standing. Cf. Valley Forge
Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464
(1982) (finding that any injury to an individual member of the public because of grant of
federal land to religious group was too diffuse to warrant standing). A finding that the public
has a constitutional right to free trademark use might raise questions about the repealability in
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owner, the "least restrictive remedy" formula may not, however, suffice in all instances to protect the owner's and the public's liberty
interests in the trademark. That the remedy be the least restrictive is
only one of the four first amendment criteria set forth in Central
Hudson.11 1

12
b. Monopolization.-In Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 2
the Supreme Court affirmed a district court order that, inter alia,
prohibited Ford from using its name on spark plugs for five years.111
The district court held that Ford had violated section 7 of the Clayton Act'1 4 by purchasing Autolite's only domestic spark plug plant,
the "Autolite" trade name, a battery installation, and limited distribution rights.11 5 Before the acquisition, the spark plug manufacturing trade had been highly concentrated. 1 ' Instead of entering the
market de novo, Ford chose to enter by the less costly means of acquisition.117 As one of the "Big Three" automobile manufacturers
and thus a major purchaser of spark plugs, Ford had exercised substantial procompetitive influence on the spark plug market. By acquiring Autolite's assets, Ford ceased to affect the market as a potential entrant, thus decreasing competition. 1 8
Because of the propensity of spark plug installers to replace
plugs with those of the same manufacturer (an original equipment or

toto of the Lanham Act. For example, if the Act were repealed, could the government ban
trade name use completely? Could it bar actions for trademark infringement? It is no more
necessary to anticipate answers to all these questions in this area than in any other area of
constitutional torts, because liberty interests, like property interests, always arise in the first
instance from common law, statute, or usage. Cf. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327
(1937) (Cardozo, J.) (dictum) ("Of [the freedom of thought and speech] one may say that it
is the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom. With rare
aberrations a pervasive recognition of that truth can be traced in our history, political and
legal.").
111. See supra text accompanying note 71.
112. 405 U.S. 562 (1972).
113. United States v. Ford Motor Co., 315 F. Supp. 372, 378 (E.D. Mich. 1970), af'd,
405 U.S. 562 (1972).
114. Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The Act prohibits the
acquisition of stock or assets where the result may substantially lessen competition or create a
monopoly "in any line of commerce in any section of the country." Id.
115. United States v. Ford Motor Co., 286 F. Supp. 407, 410 (E.D. Mich. 1968). Separate proceedings were held to determine: (1) whether Ford violated § 7 of the Clayton Act;
and (2) what remedy should attach to such violation. The liability issue is reported at 286 F.
Supp. 407, while the remedy issue is reported at 315 F. Supp. 372, affd, 405 U.S. 562.
116, 405 U.S. at 570.
117. Id. at 566.
118. Id. at 566-71.
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"OE"tie) 119 the district court enjoined Ford for ten years from manufacturing spark plugs, ordered Ford to purchase one-half of its total
annual requirement of spark plugs for the next five years from the
divested plant under the "Autolite" name, and prohibited Ford for
five years from using its own name on plugs. 120
A majority of the Supreme Court felt that preventing Ford
from selling plugs under its own name during the five-year period
would permit the divested Autolite plant to overcome the OE tie and
survive as a competitor. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun,
however, found the remedy to be unjustifiably broad. 21 Justice
Blackmun was particularly offended by the trademark restriction
and stated: "[T]o deny [Ford] the use of its own name is to deny it a
property right that has little to do with this litigation." 22
Ford is one of a number of cases in which trademark use has
been viewed as a threat to competition. In an appendix to this article, the author posits that trademark use alone, however aggressive
and ubiquitous, can never suffice to restrain trade. In every case of
an antitrust violation involving a trademark, the locus of the wrong
is a commercial practice other than trademark use, whether that
practice be monopolization, unlawful tie-in, or unlawful exclusive
dealing. None of these unlawful practices is constitutionally protected, while trademark use merits first amendment protection as
commercial speech. Consequently, a remedy other than trademark
excision should be employed to cure antitrust violations.1 23 Interference with an owner's use of its mark cannot satisfy the "least restrictive remedy" test, since it would be possible to cure the violation
without obstructing trademark use at all. Additionally, courts have
developed effective procompetitive doctrines to ensure that trademark rights do not encompass a right to restrain trade.
2. Conditioning Continued Use.-The government, most nota119.

Ford, 315 F. Supp. at 375. Id. at 378.

120. Id. The other portions of the injunction are irrelevant here. Ford was unusual in
permitting a temporary ban on trademark use, but it is not unique. See, e.g., United States v.
General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753, 848-52 (D.N.J. 1949), modified, 115 F. Supp. 835, 85859 (D.N.J. 1953).
121. Ford, 405 U.S. at 582, 583 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in

part); see id. at 595 (Blackmun, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in part).
concurring in part and dissenting in part). It appears that
122. Id. at 595 (Blackmun, J.,
the free speech issue in Ford was not urged upon the Court, although the property issue was.

See Brief for Appellant at 41, Ford, reprinted in 32

ANTITRUST LAw: MAJOR BRIEFS AND

ORAL ARGUMENT OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

79, 119-23 (P. Kurland &

G. Casper eds. 1979).
123. See McCarthy, supra note 81, at 123.
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bly the FTC, has at times conditioned advertising on the performance of some other act. 124 Such orders have generally not placed a
condition on affixation of the mark to goods. Instead, they have restricted the mark's use by restricting the commercial advertising in
which the mark could be used.
The most celebrated of these cases was In re Warner-Lambert
Co. 1 25 In that case, the FTC found that Listerine-brand mouthwash
had been advertised as a cure for colds and sore throats. 126 Such
advertising had taken place for over fifty years.12 Since the Commission found that the advertising was false 128 and would have a lingering effect even after it ceased,129 the makers of Listerine were
ordered to cease and desist from advertising Listerine as a cold remedy 30 and to
cease and desist from disseminating

. . .

any advertisement[s] for

Listerine Antiseptic unless it is clearly and conspicuously disclosed
in each such advertisement, in the exact language below that:
"Contrary to prior advertising, Listerine will not help prevent colds
or sore throats or lessen their severity." This requirement extend[ed] only to the next ten million dollars of Listerine
advertising. 131
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia modified the
Commission's order to delete the phrase "contrary to prior advertis13 2
ing," but otherwise affirmed.
Because deceptiveness was not inherent in the trade name "Listerine," excision would obviously have been inappropriate. Yet the
order severely limited Warner-Lambert's ability to bring its mark to
the public's attention in connection with truthful claims unless the
corrective phrase was also present.1 33 The court of appeals held that
124. See generally Note, "Corrective Advertising" Orders of the Federal Trade Commission, 85 HARV. L. REV. 477 (1971).
125. In re Warner-Lambert Co., 86 F.T.C. 1398 (1975), modified and affid, 562 F.2d
749 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 950 (1978).
126. 86 F.T.C. at 1486.
127. Id. at 1501.
128. Id. at 1496-97.
129. Id. at 1501-04.
130. Id. at 1513-14.
131. Id. at 1514. This requirement would terminate when Warner-Lambert had expended an advertising sum equivalent to the average annual Listerine advertising budget for
the period of April 1962 to March 1972. Id. at 1515.
132. See 562 F.2d at 763-64.
133. The administrative law judge's dubious basis for this restriction was that Listerine
advertisements about the product's ability to kill germs which would not contain the corrective
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this type of restriction on the use of the mark "Listerine" did not
violate the first amendment."'
Another example of a condition on trademark use is that imposed by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) on brand name
advertising of prescription drugs. FDA regulations require that the
generic name of the drug appear in an advertisement each time the
brand name appears, except in running text, where the generic name
may appear less frequently. 13 5 The legitimate governmental goal underlying these regulations is the promotion of competition between
brand name and generic prescription drugs. The appearance of the
generic name the first time the trademark appears accomplishes the
goal fully and no more restrictively than necessary. As originally
adopted, however, the regulations required the generic name to appear every time the brand name appeared. 3 6 Although the original
rules survived challenge in litigation, 37 the FDA wisely eliminated
the obvious overkill. As originally adopted, the regulations were
more restrictive than were necessary. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission 8s would therefore have
militated against finding them constitutional. 3"
Remedies conditioning an owner's right to use its mark on the
phrase would merely reinforce the deceptive claims of past advertising. 86 F.T.C. at 1480. The
Commission declined to rely on this rationale. See Id. at 1504 n.28. In the absence of such a
finding, it is difficult to see how conditioning the ads on the inclusion of the corrective phrase
prevents future deception. If the intent was to remedy past deception, an affirmative retraction
requirement would have been less restrictive of Warner-Lambert's trademark use. Undoubtedly, it would also have been more embarrassing to management and may have raised the
question whether Warner-Lambert has a right not to be compelled to speak. Cf. Abood v.
Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 232-37 (1977) (compulsory contributions to ideological
activities of public sector union violates first amendment rights of dissenting members).
Warner-Lambert's failure to press for the least restrictive remedy before the FTC and in the
courts militates in favor of permissive intervention by consumer groups to ensure that a trademark owner, as guardian of the public's right to free trademark use, does not waive the public
interest to further a purely private interest, such as saving management from embarrassment.
See supra note 110.
134. See 562 F.2d at 768-71.
135. See 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(b)(1) (1981). These regulations were adopted during the
1960's in much more onerous form and withstood court challenge. See, e.g., Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967). In a different setting, franchisees, compelled to display
their own names as prominently as those of their franchisors, were held not to have been
denied their first amendment rights. See Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Nevada Real Estate
Advisory Comm'n, 448 F. Supp. 1237 (D. Nev. 1978), afid, 440 U.S. 941 (1979).
136. For a discussion of the original rule, see Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S.
136, 138 (1967).
137. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
138. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
139. Id. at 566. See supra text accompanying note 71.
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performance of some other act as well as those placing time, place,
and manner restrictions on use are also subject to the Central Hudson criteria which require, inter alia, that such restrictions be no
more restrictive than necessary to achieve a legitimate governmental
goal.
3. Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions.-The Supreme
Court has stated that commercial speech is entitled to less protection
than other speech. 140 Even political speech, however, is subject to
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions.14 A fortiori, commercial speech must be subject to similar, if not greater, restrictions.
The parameters of permissible restrictions, however, are far from
clear.
In a sense, Friedman v. Rogers1 42 involved a manner restriction
by which Texas restricted the pool of trade names available to optometrists to their own personal names. 43 On the other hand, Friedman more closely resembles the excision cases in that nonpersonal
trade names were entirely banned. 44
A better example of a time, place, or manner restriction, was
imposed by the trial court in Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak
Co.14 5 Following a jury verdict finding that Kodak had engaged in
anticompetitive practices, Kodak moved on several grounds for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.1 46 Judge Frankel, the district
court judge, denied the motion in most respects.147 Berkey moved for
equitable relief, complaining of Kodak's "insistence upon using the
Kodak backprint on its color paper." 148 Although Judge Frankel
held that Kodak's use of its backprint was "insufficient to sustain the
finding of a [Sherman Act] section 2 violation in the color paper
market,"1 49 he decreed that Kodak "sell color print paper without
140. See, e.g., Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10 n.9 (1979); Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976).
141. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976). See also Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447
U.S. 530, 535 (1980); Dunagin v. City of Oxford, 489 F. Supp. 763 (D. Miss. 1980).

142. 440 U.S. 1 (1979).
143.

See supra note 64 and accompanying text.

144. Id. For a discussion of Friedman, see supra notes 41-53 and accompanying text.
145.

457 F. Supp. 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), afid in part and rev'd in part, 603 F.2d 263

(2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
146. 457 F. Supp. at 410.
147. Id. at 410, 444.
148. Id. at 424-25.
149. Id. at 425.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol11/iss4/6

24

Platt: Is a Trademark Owner's Right to Use Its Mark Protected by the Fir

1983]

TRADEMARKS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

the backprint at the option of the purchaser." 150 Of primary concern
was that the backprint might "force Kodak's photofinishing rivals to
advertise their competition."15
15 2
The Second Circuit reversed the district court on this point,
directing that the no-backprint decree be vacated as unnecessary and
that it not appear in any decree to be entered on remand. 53 The
court of appeals noted: "Judge Frankel did not expressly consider
whether his prohibition was a justifiable curtailment of Kodak's
trademark rights. 1 54 The original decree requiring Kodak not to use
its mark on color paper of its own manufacture is a good example of
a "place" restriction on an owner's ability to use its own mark. The
"reasonableness" of such a restriction should be determined by reference to the criteria set forth in Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corp. v. Public Service Commission.1 55 Thus, the legality of each
time, place, or manner restriction will be determined according to
the legitimacy of the underlying governmental goal and the possibility of fashioning a less restrictive means to that end. 56
Measured by these standards, the legality of banning the Kodak
backprint is questionable. It is not at all clear that preventing a manufacturer from placing its mark on goods to be sold by its competitors is a legitimate governmental means or goal. Can the government
compel brand name food makers to offer their food unbranded to
retailers who also sell their own house brand? I think it cannot.
Another example of a place restriction is the legislative ban on
radio and television advertising of cigarettes. 1 57 The constitutionality
150. Id. at 434. The Second Circuit found that Judge Frankel's opinion contradicted
itself on this point. 603 F.2d at 293 n.53. Judge Frankel had attempted to explain the inconsistency by pointing out that although Kodak's use of the backprint to injure photofinishers did

not support a finding of liability for monopolization, equitable relief barring the backprint was
justified to prevent Kodak's wrongful use of its monopoly power against Berkey. 457 F. Supp.
at 434 n.33.
151. 457 F. Supp. at 433-34.

152.

Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 309-10 (2d Cir. 1979),

cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
153. Id. at 293.
154. Id. The Second Circuit focused on Kodak's rights in the use of its trademark and
did not discuss the public's interest in Kodak's use of its trademark.
155. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). See supra text accompanying note 71.
156. See supra text accompanying note 71.
157. See 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1976). The ban has withstood first amendment challenge.
See Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), affd sub nom.

Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Kleindienst, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972). The challenge preceded Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748

(1976), however, and thus cannot be deemed to have put the matter to eternal rest. See Capi-
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of this ban is also questionable. The Surgeon General, at least, is
satisfied that cigarette smoking is dangerous to the health and should
be discouraged, a conclusion with which this writer will not quibble.
But if the ban was intended to discourage cigarette use, could this
not have been accomplished by use of a warning in each ad such as
that which appears on every cigarette package?
It is politically unrealistic to posit that before the government
can ban cigarette ads, it must ban cigarettes. But in banning only
radio and television ads, Congress seems to have chosen to ban certain ads because it feared they might be effective. This is paternalism of the type that Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.158 was intended to prohibit.
4. Compulsory Trademark Licensing.-In re Borden Inc.159
was a proceeding before the FTC under section 5 of the FTC Act 60
in which Borden was charged with maintaining an unlawful monopoly in processed lemon juice."" The administrative law judge found
that Borden's "ReaLemon" brand of reconstituted lemon juice was
such a monopoly162 and held that Borden would have to license the
"ReaLemon" mark to its competitors for ten years at a royalty not
to exceed one-half of one percent of dollar sales. 6 When the decision was appealed to the Commission, the majority, in a brief opinion, expressed its reluctance to try to cure the monopoly by compulsory trademark licensing. 64 Commissioner Pertschuk, however,
would have ordered "some form of trademark relief." ' 5
tal Broadcasting, 333 F. Supp. at 587-94 (Wright, J., dissenting). One economist has posited
that the ban may have raised the profits of the cigarette companies by lowering "excessive"
advertising expenditures to profit-maximizing levels. Prior to the ban, television and radio cigarette ads may have reached a level where they no longer increased aggregate demand for
cigarettes, but each company's ads merely cancelled out the other's. See F. SCHERER, supra
note 62, at 386-90.
158. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
159.
160.

161.
162.
163.
were also

92 F.T.C. 669 (1978), affid, 674 F.2d 498 (6th Cir. 1982).
15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).

92 F.T.C. at 672.
Id. at 702, 767-73.
Id. at 777. Reasonable quality standards, equivalent to that of Borden's ReaLemon,
to be part of the licensing arrangement. Id. For discussion of compulsory trademark

licensing see Dobb, Compulsory Trademark Licensure as a Remedy for Monopolization, 68
TRADE-MARK REP. 505, 506 (1978); Holmes, Trademark Licensing as Structural Antitrust

Relief. An Analytical Framework, 71 TRADE-MARK REP. 127 (1981); McCarthy, supra note
30, at 197; Palladino, Compulsory Licensing of a Trademark, 26 BUFFALO L. REV. 457
(1977), reprinted In 68 TRADE-MARK REP. 522 (1978).

164. See 92 F.T.C. at 807.
165. Id. at 813 (separate opinion of Comm'r Pertschuk on the issue of relief). The FTC
staff has also proposed compulsory trademark licensing to remedy restraints of trade in the
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One noted commentator has thoroughly excoriated the propriety
of compulsory trademark licensing. 166 Of all trademark-restricting
antitrust remedies, none is more offensive to established constitutional principles than compulsory trademark licensing. Compulsory
trademark licensing is designed to break up a monopoly by means of
consumer deception. Consumer deception is not a legitimate governmental means to accomplish an admittedly legitimate trust-busting
end.
Commissioner Pertschuk, in his separate opinion in Borden, dis167
missed the notion that compulsory licensing might be deceptive.
To the contrary, the remedy is effective only if it deceives the public.
To demonstrate this point we will return to our hypothetical. If A
Corp. is compelled to license its mark to B Corp., at least initially,
the public will cull from the mark the false information that widgets
bearing the mark were made by A Corp. or at least under A Corp.'s
quality control. This of course assumes that if the consumer knew
that B Corp. and not A Corp. had made the widget, she would not
buy it; a fair assumption, since the remedy would be indicated only
where the mark is a source of substantial market power. Suppose,
however, that the government could empower A Corp. to control the
quality of B Corp.'s A-brand widgets. Although this would render
the remedy less objectionable, it would be only a partial improvement. The public still has the right to assume that A Corp.'s licensees were chosen by A Corp. as workmanlike and trustworthy licensees, not foisted on A Corp. by the government.
As a practical matter, even in voluntary licensing, quality control generally will be performed in the first instance by the agents of
B Corp. Only if A Corp. becomes aware of lapses in quality control
will it intervene to remedy the problem or terminate the license.
Similarly with compulsory licensing, until A Corp. discovers and can
convince the government that B Corp. is in breach of its obligations,
shoddy widgets will be sold under the A mark. If this practice continues long enough, A Corp.'s proprietary interest in the mark will
be destroyed, as will the public's trust in the mark and the mark's
capacity to convey information.
A compulsory license to all of A Corp.'s competitors destroys
the mark expeditiously and destines it to become an almost certain
ready-to-eat cereal industry. See In re Kellogg Co., TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
19,898
(1972). This case was recently dropped. See TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) (Sept. 14, 1981).
166. See McCarthy, supra note 30.
167. 92 F.T.C. at 812 (separate opinion of Comm'r Pertschuk on the issue of relief).
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victim of genericide. This will certainly raise a fifth amendment just
compensation issue.1 8 Since it will also destroy the public's shorthand means of learning important product information at the point
of sale, it is anathema to the public's first amendment right to receive truthful commercial information. 6 "
III. CONCLUSION

Following the lead of Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v.
Public Service Commission,'17 courts and administrative agencies
should be sensitive to the constitutional protection owed to trademarks as commercial speech. Regulation of trademark use and the
imposition of trademark-restricting remedies should be consistent
with the principles of the first amendment and free speech. Once a
nondeceptive trademark has begun to convey quality information to
the public, governmental action which restricts a trademark owner's
right to use its mark should be sanctioned only when the restriction
is no broader than necessary to accomplish an important governmental goal and the means is legitimate and reasonably related to the
end sought.
APPENDIX: CAN A TRADEMARK REALLY BE USED TO RESTRAIN TRADE?

There is no limit to the grounds upon which imaginative counsel can

claim that his client's adversary has used its trademark in restraint of trade.
71
Such a claim can be raised either to support a claim for affirmative relief'
or by way of defense.172 Trademark owners have been alleged to restrain
trade mainly by using their marks to establish
exclusive-dealing arrange17 3
ments, tie-ins, and unlawful monopolies.
Official hostility to the dubious "monopoly" created by a mark is not
nev 17' and seems to have originated from perceived similarities between
168. "[N]or shall any person ... be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation".
U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
169. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 773 (1976).
170. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
171. See, e.g., In re Borden, Inc., 92 F.T.C. 669 (1978), aff'd, 674 F.2d 498 (6th Cir.
1982).
172.

173.

See Lanham Act § 33(b)(7), 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(7) (1976).

For a thorough overview of exclusive dealing and tie-in theories as they relate to

trademark use, see Flinn, Basic Antitrust Problem Areas and their Significance for Trademark Owners and Practitioners,67 TRADE-MARK REP. 255 (1977). See also 2 J. MCCARTHY,
supra note 12, §§ 31:23-:36, at 414-38 (1973 & Supp. 1982).
174. See, e.g., Diggins, Trade-Marks and Restraints of Trade, 32 GEo. L.J. 113

(1944). Diggins states: "The significance and effectiveness of trade-marks in regulating and
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trademark rights and the true monopoly granted by a patent. The comparison is inapposite; the hostility misdirected. 175 While it is true that a trademark owner has the exclusive right to use the mark in connection with
goods or services of a certain description, 1"8 a "monopoly" in a mark does
not of its own force become a monopoly in the goods or services in connection with which the mark is used. Moreover, both the common law of trademarks and the Lanham Act'7 are effectively designed to prevent it from
becoming so.
Exclusive-Dealing Arrangements
Section 3 of the Clayton Act"18 declares that it shall be unlawful to
lease or sell:
goods ...

or other commodities ...

on the condition, agreement, or un-

derstanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the
goods.

. .

or other commodities of a competitor.

. .

where the effect...

may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in
any line of commerce."
An exclusive-dealing arrangement is generally one in which a buyer obligates itself to buy one or more of a seller's line of products exclusively from
that seller and not from the seller's competitors. 80° As one commentator has
noted: "The antitrust issue such contracts raise is foreclosure of the competitors of that favored supplier from access to the outlets restrained by the
commitment to exclusive representation and the extent of the resulting ef'l
fect upon competition in the relevant market."
restricting competition can hardly be overemphasized. Together with patents, trade-marks are
included among the chief legal sanctions under which cartels have established, maintained and
enforced restraints of trade." Id. (footnote omitted). See also Standard Brands, Inc., v.
Smidler, 151 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1945) (Frank, J., concurring).
175. See McCarthy, Compulsory Licensing of a Trademark: Remedy or Penalty?, 67
TRADE-MARK REP. 197, 214-20 (1977); see also Seven-Up Co. v. No-Cal Corp., 183 U.S.P.Q.

(BNA) 165 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
176. See Standard Brands, Inc. v. Smidler, 151 F.2d 34, 37-43 (2d Cir. 1945) (Frank,
J., concurring).
177. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
178. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976).
179. Id. Section 3 of the Clayton Act covers only "commodities," but exclusive dealing

arrangements in non-commodities fall within the prohibitions of section 1 of the Sherman Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976), and section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45
(1976). See Flinn, supra note 173, at 255-56 nn.l-3.
180. Flinn, supra note 173, at 256.
181. Id. at 256-57. See, e.g., American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d
1230 (3d Cir. 1975); see also Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
The economic effects of such restraints are discussed in F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET
STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 286-89 (2d ed. 1980). For a critique of traditional
theories concerning the anticompetitive effect of such arrangements, see R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 201-11 (1976).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1983

29

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 4 [1983], Art. 6
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11:1261

A complaint that implicates a trademark in an exclusive-dealing arrangement would have to rest on the contractual condition or requirement
that the buyer purchase only goods bearing the seller's trademark. 18 2 The
mark itself, however, is not the gravamen of the complaint. Exclusiveness is
the gravamen, and that can be extracted as well by a seller with sufficient
bargaining power even if he has no mark.
Tie-Ins
Another type of restraint in which trademarks have been implicated is
tie-ins. 183 The Supreme Court has described a tying arrangement as:
an agreement by a party to sell one product but only on the condition that
the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product . . . . [Tying arrangements] are unreasonable in and of themselves whenever a party has
sufficient economic power with respect to the tying product to appreciably
restrain free competition in the market for the tied product.'"
Conventional theory holds that tying arrangements tend to lessen competition in the market for the tied product and deny buyers the advantages of
shopping around. 185
In two recent cases, trademark licensor/franchisors were accused of
conditioning the grant of a trademark license/franchise on the purchase by
the licensee/franchisee of other items. In Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat
Corp.,18 the district court found that the tied products or services were
film-processing services, kiosk leases, the franchisor's right to designate its
own chrome processors, and pickup and delivery service. 8 7 Over Fotomat's
assertion that these alleged "ties" were part of the purchase of a "turn-key"
operation,1 88 the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court findings of liability89 on the chrome processor tie, the pickup and delivery tie, and the lease
tie.'
In Principe v. McDonald's Corp., 90 however, the Fourth Circuit
adopted a more sanguine view of the "turn-key" or "success formula" deprodfense. The plaintiff in that case had accused McDonald's of tying two
19
ucts to its franchise/trademark: a lease and a security deposit note. 2 Mc182. See Flinn, supra note 173, at 256-60.
183. See, e.g., Principe v. McDonald's Corp., 631 F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
451 U.S. 970 (1981); Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980). See generally R. POSNER, supra note 181, at 171-84.
184. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958).
185. See id. at 6; Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704, 724 (7th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980). But see R. POSNER, supra note 181, at 171-84.
186. 606 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980).
187. Id. at 724-25.
188. Id.at 725.
189. Id. at 721-25.
190. 631 F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 970 (1981).
191. Id. at 307.
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Donald's urged the court to define the tying good broadly enough so as to
include the tied good, i.e., to hold that the tying good was not a mere trademark license/franchise, but a method of doing business, or "success

formula." 19 The Fourth Circuit agreed, stating:

Given the realities of modern franchising, we think the proper inquiry
is not whether the allegedly tied products are associated in the public mind
with the franchisor's trademark, but whether they are integral components
of the business method being franchised. Where the challenged aggregation is an essential ingredient of the franchised system's formula for suc19 3
cess, there is but a single product and no tie-in exists as a matter of law.

Exclusive-dealing and tying arrangements have not given rise to remedies which restrict an owner's right to enforce its trademark rights. The

most appropriate remedies are obvious, i.e., to break up the tie-in19 4 or the
exclusiveness of the arrangement,"95 as the case may require.
Monopolization

It is in the monopolization area that the trademark is most often alleged to be at the root of an antitrust violation. It is in this area also where
the trademark owner's rights are most threatened because the obvious remedy, breaking up the monopolist, is heavily disfavored. 196 In monopolization
cases, the trademark itself may become the target of an administrative or
192. See id. at 309. For an additional formulation of the trademark-as-tying-good issue,
see Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,449, at 72,516,
72,519-21 (9th Cir. 1982). There, the Ninth Circuit posited that there are two types of
franchise systems, those where the mark identifies the "business format system" and those
where the mark identifies to the public only the goods sold under the mark. According to this
theory, franchises are not necessarily of the same type with respect to every good. Id. at 72,520
n. 11. The court held the Baskin-Robbins system to be of the product-identifying type and so
found no need to express an opinion on whether a trademark could ever be so closely identified
with a business format system as to render the mark and the business format one good. Id. at
72,520 n.10. As to trademarks that identify only goods sold under the mark, the court stated
that "[t]he desirability of the trademark and the quality of the product it represents are so
inextricably interrelated in the mind of the consumer as to preclude any finding that the trademark is a separate item for tie-in purposes." Id. at 72,521 (emphasis added). The court distinguished its earlier ruling in Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971),
stating that in Siegel the tied products, including paper goods, were so unrelated to the Chicken Delight business franchise system that they must be deemed separate goods. See Krehl,
1982-I Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 64,449, at 72,520. See generally Harkins, Tying and the Franchisee, 47 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 903 (1979); Zeidman, The Rule of Reason in FranchisorFranchiseeRelationships,47 A.B.A. ANTITRuST L.J. 873, 881-85 (1979).
193. Principe,631 F.2d at 309. See also R. POSNER, supra note 181, at 181. "The tie-in
doctrine furnishes no answer to the question of when a sale consists of a combination of separate products or when it is a single product made up of components ..... Id.
194. See International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 398-402 (1947).
195. See United States v. Standard Oil Co., 78 F. Supp. 850, 889-92 (S.D. Cal. 1948),

affd, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
196. See R. POSNER, supra note 181, at 78-95.
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judicial remedy. 19 7 Nonetheless, the gravamen of a monopoly claim is the
exclusionary behavior of the alleged monopolist in the market for goods or
services allegedly monopolized, 198 not the monopolist's use of its mark. Indeed, it is difficult to hypothesize facts in which a monopolist could have
attained its position solely or primarily by trademark use, however
nefarious.
Lanham Act Section 33(b)(7)
Monopolization claims have been asserted offensively in monopolization cases 9 9 and defensively to challenges brought under section 33(b)(7)
of the Lanham Act, 200 which provides:
(b) If the right to use the registered mark has become incontestable
...the registration shall be conclusive evidence of the registrant's exclusive right to use the registered mark in commerce on or in connection with
the goods or services specified

. . .

except when one of the following de-

fenses or defects is established:
(7) That the mark has been or is being used to violate the antitrust
laws of the United States.201
In Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, °2 Judge Mansfield
of the Southern District of New York thoroughly reviewed the legislative
history of section 33(b)(7),10 as well as the relevant cases up to that
time.20 ' The Carl Zeiss decision stands firmly for the proposition that in
asserting the defense of section 33(b)(7),
it is not enough merely to prove that merchandise bearing a trademark,
however valuable the trademark, has been used in furtherance of antitrust
violations. .

.

. An essential element.

. . is

proof that the mark itself has

been the basic and fundamental vehicle required and used to accomplish
the violation. 0 '
197. See Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972) (limiting Ford's use of
its trademark on sparkplugs).
198. Such behavior is a material element of the monopolization offense under Sherman
Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263

(2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
199. In In re Borden, 92 F.T.C. 669 (1978), a.fd, 674 F.2d 498 (6th Cir. 1982), the
FTC claimed that Borden had effectively used its ReaLemon trademark to establish a monopoly in the concentrated lemon juice market. Id. at 672. The case received notoriety for the
administrative law judge's recommendation, rejected by the Commission, that Borden be com-

pelled to license the ReaLemon mark to its competitors. See id. at 767, 773, 777, 807.
200. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(7) (1976).
201. Id.
202. 298 F. Supp. 1309 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), modified on other grounds, 433 F.2d 686 (2d
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 905 (1971).
203. Id. at 1312-14.

204. Id. at 1314-16.
205. Id. at 1315 (emphasis added).
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Although Judge Mansfield rejected the defense of section 33(b)(7) on the
facts of that case,206 he stated in dictum that in the exercise of its equity
powers, the court could impose the unclean hands doctrine and "deny enforcement of a trademark on the part of one who has used that trademark
in violation of the antitrust laws. ' '20 7 The court thus indicated that the antitrust defense, if successful, might in an appropriate case constitute a complete defense to a claim for trademark infringement. 20 8 Despite the court's
painstaking research into the issue, however, no such case was cited in the
opinion.209 In fact, although several courts have refused to strike a section
33(b)(7) defense at preliminary stages of litigation, 21 0 this author has been
206. Id.
207. Id. at 1314 (citing Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942)).
208. See id. In drawing a parallel between the misuse defense in patent litigation and
the antitrust defense in trademark litigation, Judge Mansfield was careful to distinguish the
two:
The distinction arises from the fact that a patent represents a grant of a limited
monopoly that in most instances would, absent its legalization by Congress, constitute an unlawful restraint of trade. The limited monopoly is granted in exchange for
disclosure of the patented invention to the public so that it may be utilized in free
competition upon expiration of the patent. A valid trademark, on the other hand,
merely enables the owner to bar others from use of the mark, as distinguished from
competitive manufacture and sale of identical goods bearing another mark, or even
no mark at all, since the purpose of trademark enforcement is to avoid public confusion that might result from imitation or similar unfair competitive practices rather
than to authorize restraints upon trade.
Id.
209. The court declared that although the defense of section 33(b)(7) is difficult to
prove, proof is not impossible. See id. at 1315. In support of this proposition, the court cited
Phi Delta Theta Frat. v. J.A. Buchroeder & Co., 251 F. Supp. 968 (W.D. Mo. 1966), in which
the court refused to strike the section 33(b)(7) defense. There, the defense was raised that
defendant had attempted to monopolize the "insignia goods" business by securing "Sole Official Jeweler Contracts" from every fraternity and sorority in the United States. See id. at 97071.
210. See, e.g., Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366 (7th Cir.) (theory
of antitrust defense not alleged below but could be tried on remand), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
830 (1976); Costandi v. Aamco Automatic Transmissions, Inc., 456 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1972)
(antitrust theory not specified in opinion); Phi Delta Theta Frat. v. J.A. Buchroeder & Co.,
251 F. Supp. 968 (W.D. Mo. 1966) (monopoly theory); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Marshall-Wells
Co., 1959 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 69,343, at 75,271 (N.D. Ill. 1959) (theory of antitrust defense
not set forth); Sanitized, Inc. v. S.C. Johnson & Sons, Inc., 23 F.R.D. 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1959)
(antitrust theory not stated); Forstmann Woolen Co. v. Murray Sices Corp., 10 F.R.D. 367
(S.D.N.Y. 1950) (antitrust defenses unconnected with trademark use; defense stricken but
leave to replead granted). But see, e.g., Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Church & Dwight Co.,
560 F.2d 1325 (7th Cir. 1977) (monopoly theory), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1070 (1978); CarFreshner Corp. v. Auto Aid Mfg. Corp., 438 F. Supp. 82 (N.D.N.Y. 1977) (monopoly theory
dismissed); Coca-Cola Co. v. Howard Johnson Co., 386 F. Supp. 330 (N.D. Ga. 1974) (vertical territorial restrictions theory dismissed on grounds that defendant was not plaintiff's distributor, so defendant not harmed); Jerrico, Inc. v. Jerry's, Inc., 376 F. Supp. 1079 (S.D. Fla.
1974) (defense voluntarily withdrawn; antitrust theory unspecified); Rayette-Faberge, Inc. v.
Riverton Labs., Inc., 1968 Trade Cas. (CCH) 72,643, at 86,300 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (antitrust
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unable to locate a final reported decision in which section 33(b)(7) has been
asserted successfully211as a defense either to incontestability or to a whole
infringement claim.
The notorious lack of success of section 33(b)(7) in litigation cannot be
attributed to judicial insensitivity to the possibility that a trademark may
be used to violate the antitrust laws. To the contrary, courts and legislatures have been so attuned to the potentially anticompetitive attributes of
trademarks that other doctrines have been developed to ensure that trademarks cannot be used to restrain trade.
Procompetitive Limitations on Trademark Rights
Opponents of the widespread use of trademarks and the "irrational
advertising"2 1 2 often associated with such use regard a strong trademark as
a bludgeon which the owner may use to thwart the success of actual and
potential competitors.2 13 According to this view, a court which enforces a
powerful mark against an infringer allows itself to be used as a tool for the
furtherance of monopoly.2 14 The analogy, however, is inapposite. A bludgeon can be used without judicial approbation, but a trademark owner who
wishes to assert his exclusive rights against an infringing competitor must
persuade a judge to issue an injunction against the competitor. Since courts
will not willingly permit their process to be invoked to violate established
public policy, 21 5 they have developed several doctrines, applicable in numerous trademark contexts, to preserve competition. Thus, the antitrust laws
and the Lanham Act have been read in pari materia.
One such procompetitive doctrine is that which requires a mark to be
used in order for rights to attach.216 In the absense of such a requirement,
one who first conceived a mark would be able to prevent an actual business
from using it. The owner of a mark must "use it or lose it."' 21 7 One cannot
retain exclusive rights in a mark simply by having once owned a business
that used the mark. After two years of continuous nonuse, abandonment is
defense dismissed as vague, conclusory, and unsupported by any evidence). See generally Hill,
Antitrust Violations as a Defense to Trademark Infringement, 71 TRADE-MARK REP. 148

(1981).
211.

For a discussion of antitrust violations asserted as a defense to trademark infringe-

ment and to defeat incontestable registrations, see 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 31:25, at
418-19 (1973).
212.
213.
214.

See McCarthy, supra note 30, at 243-54.
See, e.g., id. at 244-47.
See id.

215. See IA, Pt. 2, J. MOORE, W. TAGGART, A. VESTAL, & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.311 [1], at 3163-64 (2d ed. 1982) (federal court sitting in diversity will not
enforce contracts made in non-forum state where contract is contrary to public policy of forum
state).
216. See Weiner King, Inc. v. Wiener King Corp., 615 F.2d 512 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
217. The Lanham Act deems a mark to be "abandoned" once it is no longer in use and
there is intent not to resume use. Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1976).
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presumed. 218 Another procompetitive doctrine is that of "functionality,"
which provides that a functional element of a good cannot receive trademark protection if competitors would thus be prevented from competing in
2 19
the market for the good.
The most effective procompetitive limitation on trademark rights is
what has, because of its awesome implications, come to be known as
"genericide. '220 In functional terms, a generic signal is one that has ceased
to perform the trademark function, i.e., it no longer distinguishes the goods
of the owner from the goods of others. 221 In seeking public recognition, aggressive trademark owners have sought to make their marks synonymous in
the public mind with the good or service in connection with which the mark
is used. Purely as a marketing matter, A Corp. would want a widget user to
walk into the retailer's place of business and ask for an "A" instead of a
"widget," because if the retailer is honest and knows what the law requires, 222 he will sell the customer only an A-brand widget. If the term
"widget," however, is popularly unused, and if A widgets so dominate the
market that the common descriptive name for widgets has become A, A
Corp. is in jeopardy of losing its exclusive right to use the A mark on widgets. "A" would then be usable by any widget maker as the common descriptive name of the good, so that B Corp. could sell, instead of a B-brand
widget, a B-brand A. 228 This hypothetical is incapable of delineating all the
subtleties and exceptions to the genericity doctrine,224 but it does illustrate
how courts, on a regular basis, prevent a "monopoly" in a mark from being
transformed by the owner into a monopoly in the good or service in connection with which the mark is used.
Notwithstanding these procompetitive limitations on trademark rights,
the very inclusion of section 33(b)(7) in the Lanham Act seems to indicate
that Congress contemplated that these doctrines might be insufficient to
prevent owners from using their trademarks as instruments of monopolizaId.
219. See Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1218 (8th Cir.),
ceri. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976) ("The question in each case is whether protection against
imitation will hinder the competitor in competition.") (citing In re Hollaender Mfg. Co., 511
F.2d 1186, 1188 (C.C.P.A. 1975); Best Lock Corp. v. Schlage Lock Co., 413 F.2d 1195, 1199
(C.C.P.A. 1969)).
220. See generally Swann, The Economic Approach to Genericism: A Reply to Folsom
and Teply, 70 TRADE-MARK REP. 243 (1980). The Lanham Act provides for cancellation of
218.

the registration of marks. See Lanham Act § 14(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1064(c) (1976).
221. See 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 12:1, at 405-06 (1973).
222. See 1 R. CALLMANN, LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION,TRADEMARKS AND
LIES

MONOPO-

§ 2.02 (L. Altman, rev. ed. 1981).

223. Some familiar generic terms which once served as trademarks are aspirin, cola, dry
ice, escalator, shredded wheat, the pill, and thermos. For a fuller list of generic terms, see 1 J.
MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 12:3 (1973).
224. For an in-depth discussion of the genericity doctrine, see id. §§ 12:1-:18 (1973 &

Supp. 1982).
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tion. The logic behind this construction would be: (1) The doctrines of use,
abandonment, and genericity were expressly included in the statute; (2) If
section 33(b)(7) had been intended to incorporate no more than these doctrines, then it would be mere surplusage; (3) Since surplusage is not to be
presumed, section 33(b)(7) therefore must have been intended as a further
limitation on the anticompetitive use of trademarks. Although this logic is
irrefutable as far as it goes, it fails to account for the possibility that the
congressional draftsmen were aware that there are innumerable imaginative
ways to restrain trade and intended section 33(b)(7) to give courts sufficient
leeway to develop new doctrines to ensure that the Lanham Act would not
become a statutory exception to the antitrust laws.225
Although section 33(b)(7) has not been very useful in litigation thus
far, it should not be repealed, lest repeal be construed as congressional intent that the procompetitive doctrines incorporated in the Lanham Act
should be held exclusive.226
Does section 33(b)(7) conform with the Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission22= criteria for governmental restrictions on the use of trademarks that indicate quality? The question is
unanswerable in the abstract and must be examined in each case where the
defense is asserted. The question should not even arise if the mark has not
reached its maximally informative phase. This much, however, can be
stated in the abstract: If the mark is found to be protected, then the congressional objective of preserving competition should always be held substantial. As long as the defense is sustained only in cases where judicial
enforcement of the owner's trademark rights would otherwise further a restraint of trade, the defense is no broader than necessary to achieve the
legitimate end of preserving competition.
To conclude, it can be safely said that cases in which a trademark is
actually used to restrain trade are exceedingly rare. The procompetitive
limitations adopted by courts on a case-by-case basis have thus far served
admirably in preventing the trademark right from encompassing any right
to stymie competition. It is far more common for trademarks to serve a
procompetitive function than to serve an anticompetitive one. As the Third
Circuit recently stated:
The adoption of a distinctive trade dress as a means of identifying a product with its source is a legitimate means for the promotion of the user's
business, and permitting piracy of that identifying trade dress can only
225. The Supreme Court has been leery of attempts to justify anticompetitive acts by
reference to the duties imposed on a trademark owner by the Lanham Act. See United States
v. Scaly Co., 388 U.S. 350, 356 n.3 (1967); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341
U.S. 593, 599 (1951).
226. For a contrary opinion, see Smith, Trademarks and Antitrust: The Misuse Defense
Under Section 33(b)(7) of the Lanham Act, 4 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'v 161 (1981).
227. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
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discourage other manufacturers from making a similar individual promotional effort. Moreover allowing a manufacturer to be able to acquire and
maintain a reputation for consistent good quality is certainly procompetirive. Permitting a business climate in which substitutions of products over
which the first manufacturer has no quality control in the long run can
only discourage the effort to compete on the basis of reputation for
quality. 2

228. SK&F Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc., 625 F.2d 1055, 1067 (3d
Cir. 1980) (emphasis added).
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